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The Price of Abuse: Intel and the European Commission
Decision
Robert H. Lande1

I. INTRODUCTION
he May 13, 2009 decision by the European Commission (“EC”) holding that Intel
violated Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and should be fined a record amount and
prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, set off a predictable four part chorus
of denunciations:
1. Intel did nothing wrong and was just competing hard;
2. Intel’s discounts were good for consumers;
3. The entire matter is just another example of Europeans protecting their own
against a more efficient U. S. company; and
4. Even if Intel did engage in anticompetitive activity, the fine was much too large.
These assertions will be addressed in turn.

II. WAS INTEL SIMPLY ENGAGING IN NORMAL COMPETITION ON THE MERITS?
The European Commission rightfully condemned Intel for abusing its monopoly
position in the marketplace. Specifically, the EC ruled that Intel:
•

“[G]ave wholly or partially hidden rebates to computer manufacturers on
condition that they bought all, or almost all, their x86 CPUs from Intel.”

•

“[M]ade payments to major retailer Media Saturn Holding from October 2002 to
December 2007 on condition that it exclusively sold Intel‐based PCs in all
countries in which Media Saturn Holding is active.“

•

“[I]nterfered directly in the relations between computer manufacturers and
AMD. Intel awarded computer manufacturers payments—unrelated to any
particular purchases from Intel—on condition that these computer
manufacturers postponed or cancelled the launch of specific AMD‐based
products.”

1 Venable Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law, and a Director of the American Antitrust
Institute. I would like to thank John Connor and Bert Foer for helpful suggestions, and Christine Carey for excellent
research assistance.
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It’s difficult to even conceive of legitimate business justifications for these
practices. None of this constitutes competition on the merits. None of it constitutes
competition on the basis of efficiency, price, quality, variety, or service. None of it is
even close to the line between legality and illegality. Rather, hidden rebates to computer
manufacturers on condition they buy all, or almost all, of their x86 CPUs from Intel, and
direct payments to a major retailer on condition it stock only computers with Intel x86
CPUs, effectively prevented customers—and ultimately consumers—from choosing
alternative products even if those were the products they most wanted. Moreover,
Intel’s payments to computer manufacturers to halt or delay the launch of specific
products containing competitors x86 CPUs as well as to limit the sales channels available
to these products slows down the pace of innovation, which harms consumers directly.
This conduct anticompetitively restricted innovation and limited choice in the
x86 microprocessor market. By contrast, free competition would have accelerated the
very kind of innovative advances that offer consumers more choice and lower prices.
Unless one does not believe that a main function of free markets is to provide consumers
with better choices and lower prices through competition on the merits, there is no
escaping the conclusion that Intel’s conduct was anticompetitive.

III. WERE INTEL’S DISCOUNTS GOOD FOR CONSUMERS?
Intel and its apologists argue that Intel was offering discounts to computer
makers and retailers that eventually were passed to consumers in the form of lower
prices. Regardless of their effects on a competitor, shouldn’t we focus on the consumers
who ultimately will purchase the chips, and applaud Intel’s discounts?
We should indeed focus on consumers. But this does not mean that Intel’s
discounts were in the public interest.
First, Intel’s payments and discounts were shams. Prices only decreased after
they had been increased initially. The only purpose of the reductions was to hinder an
equally efficient competitor.2 Here is a very simplified version of how some of the
discounts worked.
Imagine that Acme Computer buys 10 chips a month from Intel at $8 each.
Suppose AMD wanted to sell chips to Acme, and offered to sell it 2 chips at $5 each.
2 A recent American Antitrust Institute Working Paper authored by Norman Hawker, AAI Senior Fellow and
Professor at Western Michigan University’s Haworth College of Business, notes dynamics unique to the x86 industry that
make it particularly vulnerable to coercive and exclusionary pricing schemes:

“[g]iven the razor thin profit margins of OEMs, they can hardly refuse to take advantage of the inducements
offered by Intel. Put another way, they cannot risk discriminatory price retaliation or other punitive business
terms that would disadvantage them against more ‘loyal’ competitors. Payment not to use AMD chips
directly excludes AMD from competing in the marketplace. While below cost pricing is controversial in
American antitrust law, the controversy primarily concerns whether such pricing occurs in a particular
instance, not its anticompetitive effect.”
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These lower AMD prices certainly would be beneficial for competition and consumers.
Suppose, however, that when Acme turned to Intel for the remaining 8 chips it
needed, Intel replied that its prices had increased to $10 per chip, but that if Acme
purchased all 10 chips from Intel, their price would still only be $8 each. Acme would
quickly calculate that $8x10 = $10x8. In other words, under Intel’s new pricing plan it
would be giving away the last two chips for free. It would make no sense for Acme to
purchase any chips from AMD for $5 each, or even for 1¢ each. From Intel’s perspective
it still gets the same $80 from Acme Computer. In addition, its carefully designed
“discount” has excluded its would‐be competitor. This highly stylized rendition of a
part of Intel’s conduct shows how sham discounts can block entry and put even equally
efficient rivals out of business.
Second, Intel did not make discounts generally available or compete generally on
the basis of lower prices, either of which might well have led to lower prices for
consumers. Rather it made its strategic and discriminatory payments or sham “first
dollar” discounts to computer makers for the purpose of inducing them to boycott
Intel’s only significant rival, AMD, and it paid retailers on the condition they not carry
products containing its rival’s chips. There is a crucial difference between competing on
the basis of lower prices, and paying to have a rival excluded. If this had been a track
meet, the EC referee would not have found that Intel had used steroids to enable itself to
run faster, but instead had tripped its rival.
The Commission rightly concluded that this attempted exclusion was “bad news
for competition and consumers.” If Intel is permitted to succeed in its anticompetitive
campaign, one of the world’s most critical industries might soon be monopolized
completely and for the foreseeable future. In the long term, Intel’s only true rival, AMD,
could be weakened so much that it no longer will be able to invest the immense amounts
required to engage in the innovation and to build the production facilities required to
produce the next generation of chips. Investors will be reluctant to support
future investment in innovation by Intel’s only competitor if they know that Intel will be
permitted to artificially limit the return on AMD’s investments.
Intel not only undermined competition on the merits at a time when AMD had
created a better product that threatened Intel, but also threatened the future of
innovation in this market. Without the spur of a rival, Intel’s incentives to innovate
could fall substantially, and a dynamic duopoly could turn into a lazy monopolist.
Consumers in the United States should be thankful the Europeans have taken this law
enforcement action, because without it in the long run they would pay more and have
inferior products.

IV. WAS THE COMMISSION JUST PROTECTING A EUROPEAN COMPETITOR?
4
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An early Wall Street Journal Review & Outlook editorial on this case was titled,
“Intel in Euro‐Land.” The Journal summarized its view: ʺ[t]he case against Intel is the
latest in a series of EU assaults on successful U.S. technology.” Predictably, the Journal
was outraged by the European Commission’s Statement of Objections against Intel. How
dare they tell U. S. companies how to conduct business! As usual, the Journal viewed the
Commission’s action as another pathetic example of jealous European regulators
punishing a U.S. company for beating European high technology companies on the
merits! In this case the European Commission actually was acting to protect such
European companies as....
All this would make a great story, if only it were true. Step back for a few
minutes. Forget the technical details only a computer nerd truly can understand, the
legal charges only an antitrust lawyer can fathom, and all of the immense complications.
Consider the big picture of what is really going on in the Intel case.
First, there is no European company that competes with Intel in the affected
market. Intel’s only significant x86 rival, AMD, is American. Although AMD certainly
did supply information to the Commission, its information was verified several times,
and it was only one of many sources of information that the Commission relied upon.
This experienced enforcement organization, whose work has in recent years been
carefully scrutinized by an often unsympathetic reviewing court, naturally realizes that
it can be used by competitors for their own purposes and that the evidence and
arguments it puts forward will have to meet a high level of rigor.
Further, while some PCs purchased in Europe are made there, most are imported
from Asia. If the Commission really is acting to help corporations, it can only be these
mostly‐Asian computer makers or the United States‐based AMD. How likely is
protecting either of these the Commission’s true motive? Maybe, just maybe, the
Commission actually is trying to do what it said: protect “competition” and protect
“consumers” from, among other things, paying monopoly prices, and suffering from
diminished consumer choice. Is this really intuitively implausible?
The Europeans have every right to tell any corporation that desires to do
business in Europe how to behave. Conversely, any foreign company that wishes to sell
within the United States has to compete by our rules. Consider what happened, for
example, to the international vitamins cartels, which were organized out of Switzerland.
Every cartel member was a European or Japanese vitamin manufacturer. Together they
raised the prices of most vitamins sold in the United States for much of the 1990s, by an
average of more than 40 percent. After they were caught, one company—Hoffman‐La
Roche, a Swiss company—alone paid a $500 million fine to the U. S. government. The
cartel also was subjected to a swarm of private treble damage suits in U.S. courts by
victimized U.S. consumers. Even though no other country in the world imposes treble
5
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damages on price fixers, these foreign cartelists were forced to pay more than $4 billion
to American consumers in these private lawsuits.
Was the United States simply exhibiting hatred of Swiss companies? Of course
not. The cartel members sold vitamins in the Unites States, so it is only fair they were
subjected to our laws against price fixing. Similarly, it is fair for any foreign company
wishing to operate in Europe to obey European laws. If Intel does not want to obey
European laws, it can choose to forgo selling into the lucrative European market.
Moreover, the EC’s findings are substantially similar to those of the Korean Fair
Trade Commission, whose meticulous and detailed opinion found many of the same
abuses that the EC documented. The Korean decision expressly penalized Intel for
forcing South Korean consumers to purchase computers at higher prices given that
domestic PC makers were forced to buy Intel’s costlier CPUs. The Korean decision gives
the EU findings substantial additional credibility.
The Japanese Fair Trade Commission entered into a settlement with Intel
concerning many of these issues. Intel’s conduct is also under very active investigation
by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the New York Attorney General’s Office.
Intel might yet prevail on appeal in the EC case. But observers should not assign
illegitimate motives to the European or Korean lawsuit or findings. The Commission’s
ultimate goal is neither to attack an American company nor to protect European firms.
Far from being protectionist, the EU’s decision is part of a growing worldwide
consensus. Just as the European enforcers were protecting European consumers, the
Koreans were protecting Korean consumers, and the Japanese were protecting Japanese
consumers; letʹs hope the American enforcers will protect American consumers.

V. WAS THE FINE TOO LARGE?
Even if Intel’s conduct was anticompetitive, was the Commission’s $1.45 billion
fine too large? It was, after all, the largest fine ever imposed against a single corporation
for a competition law or antitrust offense in any EC or U.S. case.
To the contrary, the fine was much too low.
Intel’s total corporate sales during the violation period were approximately $184
billion, and its sales of the relevant products, X86 chips, were somewhat less than $131
billion.3 Thus, if the fine is figured as a percentage of Intel’s total sales, it is slightly less
than 1 percent; figured as a percentage of X86 chip sales, it is slightly greater than 1
percent. Viewed either way, a fine of approximately 1 percent is unlikely to be enough to
convince Intel to change its illegal conduct. The opposite is in fact much more likely: the

3 The violation period was Oct. 2002 to Dec. 2007. The $131 billion total is for their Microprocessor revenue, so it
includes more than just X86 chip revenue. These figures were obtained from Intel 10K and10Q financial statements for the
relevant period.
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implicit message of a 1 percent fine is for Intel to simply assume that its costs went up by
1 percent and that dealing with the Commission is just another cost of doing business.
An alternative way to view the fine is as a percentage of Intelʹs firm‐wide
operating profits during the conduct period. Intel earned approximately $45 billion
profit overall during the violation period, and its Microprocessor profits were roughly
$56 billion.4 Even the lower figure is more than 30 times the EC’s $1.45 billion fine.
Ideally we would compare this fine to the percentage of Intel’s $45 billion profit that was
attributable to its illegal conduct. However, since the Commission did not compute this
figure we cannot perform this calculation. One highly imperfect but nevertheless
suggestive benchmark can, however, be provided by an empirical study of average
cartel markups. Over a substantial period, illegal cartels have averaged mean markups
of 31‐49 percent, and median markups of 22‐25 percent.5 I know of no similar figures
ever computed for monopolies or dominant firms. Nevertheless, even the lowest of
these figures suggests that if monopolies raise prices on average as high as cartels, Intel
might have been able to raise prices by some 22 percent of $131 billion, or $29 billion,
due to its illegal conduct, and that a fine at least this large would have been appropriate.
This same study found that cartels were able to achieve peak price increases that
were at the monopoly levels, which were roughly double the mark‐ups just mentioned.
Thus it is certainly possible that Intel might have been able to raise prices by as much as
40 percent of its sales revenues, or roughly $50 billion, due to its illegal conduct. This is
an additional reason to believe the EC’s $1.45 billion fine surely left Intel with an
immense profit from its violation.
Not only should the fine have been much larger: it could have been much larger.
The Commission’s Guidelines state: “[t]he ceiling of fines that can be imposed on
companies is fixed by Article 23(2) of Council Regulation No 1/2003 (10 percent of the
undertaking’s total turnover in the preceding business year).” To calculate: Intel’s sales
last year were $38 billion, therefore the fine could have been $3.8 billion. In addition, the
Commission’s Guidelines suggest that ʺfines may be based on up to 30 percent of the
companyʹs annual sales to which the infringement relates, multiplied by the number of
years of participation in the infringement.” Since the Commission’s press release said
that 30 percent of Intel’s sales were in Europe, 30 percent of $131 billion is $39 billion; 30
percent of $39 billion would yield an $12 billion fine. Although these Guidelines also
provide that fines calculated this way are subject to the 10 percent cap, these figures
nevertheless help to reinforce the conclusion that a fine much larger than $1.45 billion
could and should have been imposed.
4 Id. Their Microprocessor profit was approximately $56 billion, but this includes profits and losses from products
other than X86 chips.
5 See John M. Conner & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80
TULANE L. REV. 513 (2005). ). See http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=787907.
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Intel’s worldwide share of the chip market has fluctuated between 70 percent
and 90 percent, and the prospects of new entry into this market are virtually nonexistent.
In the United States this level of market dominance long has been considered that of a
monopolist. Is it so surprising that a firm with a protected monopoly market share
would price like a—well, like a monopolist? AMD recently estimated these overcharges
have totaled $60 billion since 1996. Regardless whether this precise figure is accurate,
how many monopolies in history have used their power to set prices that were no higher
than the competitive level? Can Intel really expect us to assume they enjoy a protected
monopoly, yet showed this remarkable restraint? For all these reasons the EC’s $1.45
billion fine surely left Intel with a staggering reward from its illegal conduct.

VI. CONCLUSION: THIS IS WORLD WAR 4.0.
Many called the highly publicized antitrust actions of the 1990s and early 2000s
against Microsoft, by the United States and the Europeans, involving PC operating
systems and related markets, World War 3.0. Now much of the world is engaged in a
series of antitrust investigations and lawsuits against Intel that are just as important.
These cases should result in headlines and capture the public attention the same way the
Microsoft cases did a decade ago.
Although nothing in the EU is final, the Commission’s findings against Intel are
remarkably similar to those proven against Microsoft. Together, Microsoft and Intel
monopolize the two key products that comprise PCs, and commonly are referred to as
“the Wintel monopoly.” Microsoft’s share of the PC operating system market long has
exceeded 80 percent, while Intel has at least this share of the market for the X86 chips
used to power PCs worldwide. Only Intel and AMD have any chance of being a major
player in the global $33 billion X86 chip market for the foreseeable future.
Both involved a legally established monopolist trying to preserve its position
through the use of illegal tactics. In neither case was the monopolist even accused of
attempting to do this through excessive innovation, competition on the merits, or new
product introduction. Rather, in both cases the disputed tactics focused on artificial
impediments imposed against competitors—leveraging a monopoly against potential
rivals through anticompetitive tactics, disguising predatory pricing, and taking steps
specifically designed to suppress rivals.
During World War 3.0 Microsoft was found guilty of illegally
maintaining its OS monopoly by a variety of anticompetitive tactics. For example,
Microsoft took steps to prevent its browser rivals from distributing their products.
Microsoft could establish no business justification for this or for the other tactics they
deployed to destroy their main browser rival, Netscape. Similarly, Intel engaged in a
variety of abusive practices to preserve its chip monopoly. As noted above, Intel
8
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provided substantial rebates to a leading PC retailer conditioned on the retailer only
selling Intel‐based PCs, and also provided substantial sham rebates to computer
manufacturers “conditional on it obtaining all of its laptop CPU requirements from
Intel.” The sham discounts or rebates served no purpose other than to exclude Intel’s
main competitor. And there’s more: “Intel made payments in order to induce” a leading
computer manufacturer “to delay the planned launch of a product line incorporating an
AMD‐based CPU.” These actions are opposite of traditional competition on the merits.
The Bush Administration’s Department of Justice famously caved during their
Microsoft case’s remedy stage. Today, many years later, Microsoft still has a monopoly
in the PC operating systems market. In light of this sad history, PC users everywhere
should insist that enforcers pursue the Intel cases vigorously, and this time impose a
remedy tough enough to bring competition to this crucial market.
Chips are sold in a worldwide market, so the European remedy almost certainly
will have beneficial effects on chip sales in the United States. Moreover, this remedy is
likely to cause lower prices that will especially benefit people outside the industrialized
world, where there are vast numbers of people—including one billion children—for
whom a computer is a luxury beyond reach. With more competition in the
microprocessor market, people with the most pressing needs for communications and
computing power will more easily be able to afford to connect to the global village.
We need to remember that this really is a World War. Tens of millions of
computer users, from your grandmother to tomorrow’s college students in the
developing world, will be affected by its outcome. The $1.45 billion fine was the
equivalent of a parking ticket and will not seriously affect Intel’s behavior. However, the
Commission also ordered Intel to cease its illegal practices, and stated that it will
“actively monitor Intel’s compliance with this decision.” Let’s hope the European
Commission learns from the U.S. Department of Justice’s bungling of its Microsoft
decree and sticks with the issues until consumers are victorious in World War 4.0.
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